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Abstract. As smart contracts are growing in size and complexity, it
becomes harder and harder to ensure their correctness and security. Due
to the lack of isolation mechanisms a single mistake or vulnerability in the
code can bring the whole system down, and due to this smart contract
upgrades can be especially dangerous. Traditional ways to ensure the
security of a smart contract, including DSLs, auditing and static analysis,
are used before the code is deployed to the blockchain, and thus offer
no protection after the deployment. After each upgrade the whole code
need to be verified again, which is a difficult and time-consuming process
that is prone to errors. To address these issues a security protocol and
framework for smart contracts called Cap9 was developed. It provides
developers the ability to perform upgrades in a secure and robust manner,
and improves isolation and transparency through the use of a low level
capability-based security model. We have used Isabelle/HOL to develop
a formal specification of the Cap9 framework and prove its consistency.
The paper presents a refinement-based approach that we used to create
the specification, as well as discussion of some encountered difficulties
during this process.
Keywords: formal specification · smart contracts · isabelle · security.
1 Introduction
Ethereum [6] is a global blockchain platform for decentralised applications with a
built-in Turing-complete programming language. This language is used to create
smart contracts — automated general-purpose programs that have access to the
state of the blockchain, can store persistent data and exchange transactions with
other contracts and users. Such contracts have a number of use-cases in different
areas: finance, insurance, intellectual property, internet of things, voting, and
others.
However, creating a reliable and secure smart contract can be extremely
challenging. Ethereum guarantees that the code of a smart contract would be
executed precisely as it is written through the use of a consensus protocol, which
resolves potential conflicts between the nodes in the blockchain network. It pre-
vents malicious nodes from disrupting and changing the execution process, but
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does not protect from the flaws and mistakes in the code itself. And due to the
lack of any other control on the execution of the code any uncaught mistake can
potentially compromise not only the contract itself, but also other contracts that
are interacting with it and expect a certain behavior from it.
Such flaws can be turned into vulnerabilities and cause a great harm, and
there are many examples of such vulnerabilities and attacks that exploit them [2].
Developers can ensure the security of a contract using auditing, various static
analysis tools [15,11], domain-specific languages [5,7], or formal verification [3].
These are excellent tools and methods that can significantly improve the quality
of the code. But they are not so effective during the upgrades, which is a common
process for almost every sufficiently sophisticated smart contract. Upgrades are
necessary because it is the only way to fix a bug that was missed during the
verification process. However, they can also introduce their own bugs, so after
each upgrade the code needs to be verified again, which may cost a lot of time
and effort.
These issues are addressed by the Cap9 framework [4]. It provides means
to isolate contracts from each other and restrict them from doing dangerous
state-changing actions unsupervised, thus greatly reducing risks of upgrades
and consequences of uncaught mistakes. Cap9 achieves this by using a low level
capability-based security model, which allows to explicitly define what can or can
not be done by any particular contract. Once defined, such capabilities, or per-
missions, are visible to anyone and can be easily understood and independently
checked, thus increasing transparency of the system.
In order to be trusted, the Cap9 framework itself needs to be formally veri-
fied. The specification of the framework must be formalised and proved, in order
to show that it is consistent and satisfies the stated properties. Then the im-
plementation, which is a smart contract itself, must be proved to be compliant
with its specification. In this paper we are focusing only on the first part — on
developing and proving a formal specification of the Cap9 framework using the
Isabelle/HOL theorem prover [17] The paper presents a refinement-based ap-
proach that we used to create the specification, and evaluates the chosen formal
method by describing encountered difficulties during this process.
The following section outlines the features and capabilities of the Cap9 frame-
work. Section 3 presents the Isabelle/HOL specification, as well as the difficulties
we have encountered and the refinement process we used to develop it. Related
work is reviewed in Section 4. The last section concludes the paper and considers
future work.
2 Cap9 Framework
The Cap9 framework achieves isolation by interposing itself between the smart
contracts that are running on top of it and potentially dangerous actions that
they can perform, including calling other smart contracts, writing to the storage
and creating new contracts. Such actions can be performed only using special
“System Call” interface provided by the framework. Via this interface it has
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complete control over what contracts can and cannot do. Each time a system
call is executed Cap9 conducts various runtime security checks to ensure that
a calling contract indeed has necessary rights to perform a requested action. It
works similar to how operating system kernels manage accesses of programs to
the hardware (like memory and CPU) and protect programs from unauthorised
accesses to each other.
In order to ensure that a contract correctly uses the system call interface and
does not perform any actions bypassing the framework its source code needs to
be verified. Cap9 does it on-chain and it checks that the source code does not
contain any forbidden instructions, like ones allowing to make state changes,
make an external call, or self destruct. The check is called procedure bytecode
validation. The valid code is essentially only allowed to perform local computa-
tions (those not involving any calls or modifications of the store) and delegate
calls to a special predefined kernel address. This is a very simple property that
can be ensured by an efficient dynamic check that is performed only once upon
the registration of the newly deployed code. Once the code is validated the cor-
responding contract can be registered in the framework as a procedure and thus
access its features.
There are system calls available to securely perform the following actions:
– Register new procedure in the framework;
– Delete a registered procedure;
– Internally call a registered procedure;
– Write data to the storage;
– Append log record with given topics;
– Externally call another Ethereum address and/or send Ether;
– Mark a procedure as an entry procedure — one that would handle all the
incoming external calls to this contract system or organisation.
As a typical smart contract, Cap9 has access to the storage — a persistent
256 x 256 bits key-value store. A small part of it is restricted and can be used
only by the framework itself. It has a strict format and is used to store the
list of registered procedures, as well as procedure data, addresses of entry and
current procedures and the Ethereum address of the deployed framework itself.
This part is called the kernel storage. The rest of the storage is open to use by
any registered procedure either directly (in case of read) or through a dedicated
system call (in case of write).
Traditional kernels have a lot of abstraction layers between programs and
hardware. Unlike them, Cap9 exposes all the underlying Ethereum mechanisms
directly to the contracts, with only a thin permission layer between them. This
layer implements a capability-based access control, according to which in order
to execute a system call a procedure must posses a capability with an explicit per-
mission. Such capability has a strict format, which is different for each available
type of system calls.
Capabilities can be used to restrict components of a smart contract system
and thus to implement the principle of least privilege. They can also be used as
base primitives to create a custom high-level security policy model to better fit
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a particular use case. Such policy would be simple to analyze and understand,
but able to limit possible damage from bugs in the code or various malicious
actions (including replacing the code of a contract via the upgrade mechanism).
Cap9 is compatible with both EVM and Ewasm applications.
3 Formal Specification
The main goal of formalizing the interface specification of the Cap9 security
framework was to ensure internal consistency and completeness of its description
as well as to provide a reliable reference for all of its implementations. The
reference should eventually serve as an intermediate between the users and the
developers of any Cap9 implementation ensuring full compatibility of all further
system uses and implementations. The source specification itself is formulated
as a detailed textual description of the system interface [19], which is language-
agnostic and relies on the binary interfaces of the underlying virtual machine.
Thus all the data mentioned in the specification is given an explicit concrete
bit-level representation, which is intended to be shared by all system users and
implementations.
3.1 Consolidation of low-level representation with high-level
semantics
One of the immediately arising challenges of formally verifying a system with
very explicit specifications on concrete data representation is efficiently establish-
ing a correspondence between this representation and the corresponding intended
semantics, which is used for actual reasoning about the system and therefore for
the actual proof.
A particular example in our case is the representation and the semantics of
capability subsets. Each capability of every procedure in the system logically
corresponds to a set of admissible values for some parameter configuration, such
as kernel storage address (for writing to the storage), Ethereum address and
amount of gas for external procedure call, log message with several special topic
fields etc. Each such set is composed of a (not necessarily disjoint) union of a
number of subsets, which in their turn directly correspond to some fixed rep-
resentations. A subset of writable addresses, for example, is represented as a
pair of the starting address and the length of a continuous range of admissible
addresses. Thus the entire write capability of any kernel procedure is a union of
such continuous address ranges.
But it’s important to note that while on one hand we clearly need to state the
set semantics of the write capability (as a generally arbitrary set of addresses),
in particular this is especially convenient semantics to be used for proofs of
generic capability properties, such as transitivity; on the other hand, however,
we have a clearly indicated format of the corresponding capability representation
stated in the system specification, which is not a set, but a range of storage cells
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holding the bit-wise representations of the starting addresses and lengths of the
corresponding ranges.
If we stick with the specified representation, we will be unable to efficiently
use many powerful automated reasoning tools provided with Isabelle/HOL, such
as the classical reasoner and the simplifier readily pre-configured for the set op-
erations. However, if we just use the set interpretation, the specification on the
concrete representation will be notoriously hard to express. Hence we likely need
several different formalizations of a notion of capability on several levels of ab-
straction. We actually used three representations: the concrete bit-wise represen-
tation, the more abstract representation with the length of the range expressed
as natural number (and with an additional invariant), and finally the set rep-
resentation. By using separate representations we ended up with small simple
proofs for both generic capability properties and their concrete representations.
3.2 Correspondence relation vs. representation function
Eventually we decided to employ the same refinement approach with several
formalizations for the entire specification, thus obtaining two representations
of the whole system: the structured high-level representation with additional
type invariants and the low-level representation as the mapping from 32-byte
addresses to 32-byte values, i.e. the state of the kernel storage. However, using
separate representations raises a problem of efficiently establishing the corre-
spondence between them. Initially we tried a more general approach based on
the correspondence relation. Yet to properly transfer properties of the high-level
representation to the low-level one, the relation should enjoy at least two prop-
erties: injectivity and non-empty image of every singleton:
lemma rel injective: "[[s ⊢ σ1; s ⊢ σ2]] =⇒ σ1 = σ2"
lemma non empty singleton: "∃ s . s ⊢ σ"
Here ⊢ stands for the correspondence relation, σ — for the high-level rep-
resentation and s — for the concrete one. We noticed that proving the second
lemma essentially requires defining a function mapping an abstract representa-
tion to the corresponding concrete one. Thus this approach results in significant
redundancy in a sense that both the function defined for the sake of proving the
second lemma and the correspondence relation itself repeat essentially the same
constraints on the low-level representation. For a very simple example consider:
definition models :: "(word32 ⇒ word32 ) ⇒ kernel ⇒ bool" (" ⊢ ") where
"s ⊢ σ ≡ unat (s (addr Nprocs)) = nprocs σ"
definition "witness σ a ≡ case addr−1 a of Nprocs ⇒ of nat (nprocs σ)"
Here not only we need to repeatedly state the relationship between the value
of kernel storage at address addr Nprocs and the number of procedures regis-
tered in the system (nprocs σ) twice, but we also potentially have to define the
address encoding and decoding functions (addr and addr−1) separately and to
prove the lemma about their correspondence. We discuss our approach to ad-
dress encoding in the following section and here only emphasize the redundancy
arising from the approach based on the correspondence relation.
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It also worth noting that merely transferring or lifting the properties stated
for one representation to another is insufficient as we would like to also be able to
conveniently represent mixed properties such as a property specifying the result
of an operation on the high level, but also stating an additional constraint on
its concrete representation e.g. that some irrelevant bits in the representation
should be zeroed and some others remain unchanged.
At the same time, the major reason for introducing the correspondence re-
lation instead of using a function is an inherent ambiguity of the encoding of
the high-level representation into the low-level one. However, after carefully re-
visiting the initial specification of the system we noticed that the ambiguity of
representation in our system actually arises only from the unused storage mem-
ory rather than from the presence of any truly distinct ways of representing the
same state. But this particular kind of ambiguity can be efficiently expressed
using a representation function with an additional parameter — i. e. the state
of the unused memory.
Let’s illustrate our formalization approach that is based on representation
functions on the example of Procedure Call capability. The specification of this
capability is as follows:
The capability format for the Call Procedure system call defines a range of
procedure keys which the capability allows one to call. This is defined as a base
procedure key b and a prefix s. Given this capability, a procedure may call any
procedure where the first s bits of the key of that procedure are the same as the
first s bits of procedure key b.
Procedure Key (24 bytes)Prex Size (1 byte)
0x00:
Here the unused space is left blank. Beforehand we strive to make the actual
formulation of the arising injectivity lemma as simple as possible by eliminating
premises of the lemma and turning them into type invariants. So we introduce
the following definitions:
typedef prefix size = "{n :: nat . n ≤ LENGTH (key)}"
definition "prefix size rep s ≡ of nat ⌊s⌋ :: byte" for s :: prefix size
type synonym prefixed capability = "prefix size × key"
definition — set interpretation of single write capability
"set of pref cap (sk :: prefixed capability) ≡ let (s , k) = sk in
{k ′ :: key. take ⌊s⌋ (to bl k ′) = take ⌊s⌋ (to bl k)}"
adhoc overloading rep prefix size rep — prefix size rep is now denoted as ⌊·⌋
definition — low-level (storage) representation of single write capability
"pref cap rep (sk :: prefixed capability) r ≡ let (s , k) = sk in
⌊s⌋ 1♦ k OR r ↾ {LENGTH (key)..<LENGTH (word32 ) − LENGTH (byte)}"
Here the parameter r represents some arbitrary memory state being overwrit-
ten by the representation of the capability. The binary representation of r is
truncated (by bit-wise conjunction with a mask) to fill the range of unused bits
before combining it with the zero-padded representation. The value of unused
memory r is propagated across all representation functions in a composable way,
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so all low-level representations are formalized with plain single-valued functions.
This approach not only allows for a simple transfer of all high-level properties
to the low-level representation, but also avoids the need in explicit definitions of
the corresponding inverse (decoding) functions. A single definition is enough to
reuse the encoding functions (along with their injectivity proofs) for the specifi-
cations of operations that require decoding of representations:
definition "maybe inv f y ≡ if y ∈ range f then Some (the inv f y) else None"
Since we don’t verify the actual implementation of the decoding functions, this
implicit definition is sufficient and greatly simplifies proofs.
There is, though, one potential weakness in this approach in that it’s still
possible to accidentally lose some non-determinism when propagating the val-
ues of the unused memory by unintentionally identifying different values of the
additional parameters. Each occurrence of the representation function should
be provided its own separate instance of an additional parameter so that e.g.
encoding of the whole kernel storage is supplied with the whole previous state of
the store as an additional parameter rather than just a single additional default
value. To systematically guarantee absence of such losses of non-determinism we
prove additional lemmas of the form:
lemma cap rep unused : "⌊c⌋ r ↾ unused = r",
where unused is the set of unused bits and ↾ restricts the range of bits by zeroing
out bits with indices not in the specified set. These lemmas, though, are proved
very easily for all our representation function definitions.
3.3 Disjointness of addresses
Another problem arising from detailed low-level specifications of memory layout,
such as the layout of the kernel storage, is the problem of reasoning about non-
intersecting memory areas. While in the context of program verification there are
such well-known approaches to reasoning about disjoint memory footprints as
separation logic [18] and dynamic frames [12], in our context of formalizing the
specification (rather than the implementation) of the system these approaches
turned out to be both too abstract and too heavyweight. Too abstract since in
separation logic the particular concrete layout of the memory footprints is left
entirely abstract, while we needed to formalize the actual mapping of the data
structures to the mostly fixed address ranges they should occupy. Too heavy-
weight since to represent the encoding of the whole kernel state with either
separation logic or dynamic frames we would need to use some additional means
to set up the embedding of the corresponding reasoning mechanism into plain
HOL, while not having any real need in verifying code involving updates to the
system state. In our approach we simply treated kernel addresses as semantic
entities with some ascribed low-level representations (concrete values). Then fol-
lowing our general use of representation functions we defined the representation
of addresses and its inverse. The inverse then can be directly used to specify the
storage layout and prove the injectivity of the overall encoding with minimal
effort. Here’s an illustrative example:
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typedef offset = "{ n :: nat . n < 2 ˆ LENGTH (byte)}" morphisms off rep off
datatype address = Nprocs | Curr proc | Proc heap offset
definition "addr rep a ≡ case a of
Nprocs ⇒ 0x0000
| Proc heap offs ⇒ 0x0200 OR of nat (off rep offs)"
definition "addr inv ≡ maybe inv addr rep"
definition "encode σ r a ≡ case addr inv a of
Some a ′ ⇒ case a ′ of
Nprocs ⇒ of nat (nprocs σ) OR (r a) ↾ ...
| Proc heap offs ⇒ encode heap σ offs r
| None ⇒ r a"
Also note the filler of the unused memory r being passed over in a top-down
manner starting from the outermost representation function.
Now we move from the problems arising from the detailed low-level speci-
fication of our target system to some more general issues of formalization and
formal proofs within the Isabelle/HOL framework that we encountered during
verification.
3.4 General Isabelle/HOL limitations
Bit-vector concatenation An example of a minor, though noticeable limita-
tions of the simple Hindley-Milner type system employed within the Isabelle/HOL
framework is its inability to express type-level sum (and other simple arithmetic
operations), while still being able to express type-level numbers. For an illus-
tration of the issue consider the following definition of bit-vector concatenation
function from the HOL-Word library that comprises an extensive Isabelle/HOL
formalization of fixed-size bit-vectors, corresponding operations and their various
properties:
definition word cat :: " ′a::len0 word ⇒ ′b::len0 word ⇒ ′c::len0 word" ...
The annotation of the form ′a::len0 constrains the type parameter ’a to
belong to the len0 type class, which has the corresponding associated operation
LENGTH(’a) returning a natural number. Thus we essentially gen type-level
numbers that can be injected into terms as natural numbers with the use of the
LENGTH operation. However, as we can see in the definition of word cat, the
result of this function has the type ’c::len0 that is generally unrelated to the
parameter types ’a and ’b. This has two basically unavoidable, but undesirable
consequences:
– Since there is no way of further constraining the resulting parameter type
’c::len0, the function word cat is forced to be partial. Generally, there is
nothing particularly special about handling of partial functions within the
Isabelle/HOL framework, but their presence has at least one undesirable
consequence for formalization of system interface specifications, which we
discuss further in this section.
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– Since the resulting type parameter ’c::len0 cannot be automatically inferred
from the arguments of word cat, if has to be explicitly specified. Normally,
this doesn’t lead to a significant type annotation burden since the parameter
can be propagated by type inference from some term with a known type. But
in case of consecutive (nested or chained) word cat applications, the inner
type parameters become essentially inaccessible for further type propagation
or inference and have to be specified explicitly e.g.
definition "entry proc addr ≡ word cat
(word cat (word cat (k prefix :: 32 word) (0x04 :: byte) :: 40 word)
(0 :: 192 word) :: 232 word) (0x000000 :: 24 word) :: 256 word"
This can be slightly mitigated by introducing some ad-hoc monomorphic
notation for hexadecimal numbers (e.g. syntactically reconstructing the type
annotation from the length of the input hexadecimal representation), but this
approach still quickly becomes unwieldy in practice, especially in the context of
the great available variety of Ethereum bit-vector types with various lengths.
First we propose a relatively simple remedy for the second problem. We
actually used our own definition of a concatenation function with a fixed result
type (the largest needed length of 256 bits) and parameter types of arbitrary
length that is ignored. Instead we provided the necessary length of the second
argument as an additional explicit parameter. Thus the whole issue of dealing
with lengths was shifted from the type to the term level eliminating the need
in any type-level representations altogether. This resulted in more approachable
definitions e.g.
definition "entry proc addr ≡
(k prefix :: 32 word) ⋊⋉224 0x04 ⋊⋉216 (0 :: 192 word) ⋊⋉24 0x000000"
Here ·⋊⋉·· denotes our concatenation function. In our opinion in the lack of depen-
dent types or other expressive capabilities of the type system the use of logical
(term-level) constraints may be often preferable to some limited meta-logical
(e.g. type-level) extensions such as the use of type classes. Now we move to the
second problem.
Partiality The presence of partial functions in the specification of an interface of
the system has a subtle undesirable property — unpredictability stemming from
the undefined results returned by the partial functions. Consider the following
very typical and general preservation lemma:
lemma preservation: "I s =⇒ I (op s a)"
Here I is an invariant of the system and op is an operation on the system
with an argument a. Let’s imagine an example instance of this kind of lemma:
Let s be a natural number, I s be the predicate s > 0 and op correspond to
the operation s ← s + s div a. Looking at the general statement of the lemma,
a rather natural interpretation of such a preservation property would be that
any application of the operation op to the system is “safe” as it preserves its
invariant. However in our particular example it’s obvious that even though the
10 Mandrykin et al.
application of op with a = 0 provably preserves the invariant, it actually has en-
tirely unpredictable consequences for the system. So specifications of operations
on the system involving partial functions may considerably mislead the reader
of the specification while remaining perfectly correct form the purely logical per-
spective. If the formal specification is to serve as a formal documentation on the
system this fact may significantly undermine the value of applying the formal
methodology for that purpose. Fortunately, there are various ways to strengthen
the specification to exclude such unintuitive definitions. For our specification we
additionally proved the following injectivity-like lemmas for every operation:
lemma injectivity like: "op s a = op s b =⇒ a ∼ b"
Here ∼ denotes some notion of equivalence for arguments of the operation in a
sense that equivalent arguments produce equivalent results. In case the operation
op actually involves some non-determinism, the formulation of the lemma should
be adjusted accordingly, thus making this non-determinism explicitly exposed for
the reader. The proof of such a lemma is enough to exclude any hidden non-
determinism, since for any non-trivial equivalence relation ∼ (∃a′. a′ 6∼ a) if the
op has non-deterministic result on a, op a may be arbitrarily chosen to be equal
to op a′ and the relation a ∼ a′ then cannot be established.
Dependent products Another limitation arising from the lack of dependent
types or other expressive type system features is inability to directly express
dependent products i.e. types of the form
∏
x::′a
f(x), where f is a type-level
function on the value x of some type ′a. A typical example of a situation, where
this seems very natural is a list of pairs of the form “capability type × capabil-
ity representation” (e.g. if the value of the first member is “Write”, than the
type of the second member should be “write capability”). Such types cannot be
directly expressed within the Isabelle/HOL framework. A typical workaround is
to use injection into some universal type with additional well-formedness pred-
icates stated as preconditions to the operations or as type invariants. Here we
were able to directly reuse our representation functions for injecting different
types of capabilities into the same universal bit-level representation.
Finally it’s important to note an essential benefit of a logical framework with
a very limited type system, which is its amenability to automation using exist-
ing readily available tools such as saturation-based provers (E-prover, Vampire,
Metis) and SMT solvers (Z3, CVC4). In our experience their use within the
Isabelle framework lead to great advantages ultimately outweighing all the lim-
itations mentioned above. Overall, the formalized specification with proofs took
about 4500 lines of Isabelle based on 25 pages of the original textual description.
4 Related Work
There are many examples of using formal methods for developing specifications
of various systems. Isabelle/HOL was used to prove functional correctness of the
seL4 operating system microkernel [13], providing a proof chain from the high-
level abstract specification of the kernel, down to the executable machine code.
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The B-method was applied to create formal models of various safety-critical
railway systems [14]. A dedicated specification language for defining the high-
level abstract models was introduced in [20].
On the other hand, verification of smart contracts is almost exclusively con-
centrated on the contract implementation, omitting the separate formalisation
of their specification. It is a valid approach if the specification is simple enough,
which is not the case for the Cap9 framework.
There are several examples of formalisation of the Ethereum virtual machine:
using the K framework [9], the Lem language [10], F* [8], and Isabelle [1], which
can serve as a basis for formal verification of the contract code. Why3 platform
for deductive program verification was recently applied for writing and verifying
smart contracts [16].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed a formal specification3 of the Cap9 framework using the
Isabelle/HOL theorem prover and proved its internal consistency. To create it we
have employed a refinement approach based on representation functions, which
allowed us to efficiently use powerful automated reasoning tools provided with
Isabelle. We have found Isabelle/HOL to be suitable for developing specifications
of smart contracts, although some minor issues were identified and outlined.
The next step is formal verification of the Ewasm implementation of the
Cap9 framework for its compliance with the Isabelle/HOL specification, which
may require developing some additional tools. Other possible direction is to
develop and verify a higher level permission system that is based on the Cap9
primitives.
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